Are the allied forces contributing positively or negatively to the chances of achieving lasting peace? This retired commodore from the Royal Navy shares his perspective.
In 2024, echoing a common Western sentiment, former Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin remarked that "NATO is the most powerful and successful alliance in history." However, just two years prior, in 2022, NATO faced a significant setback, being defeated by the Taliban, a loosely organised group of ill-equipped insurgents, after a 15-year involvement.
How do we reconcile Austin's assertion with NATO's embarrassing loss?
It is clear that NATO has never truly held the title of the most powerful military alliance in history—the World War II Allies, including the U.S., Russia, Britain, and the Commonwealth, rightfully deserve that distinction. Nonetheless, after 1945, NATO performed its role effectively, and those of us who served within it took pride in our contributions.
However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, NATO’s reputation has suffered. Its actions in Kosovo were unacceptable, but it faced humiliation in Afghanistan and now stands on the brink of strategic failure in Ukraine. Can we genuinely trust NATO to defend supposedly democratic Europe against what is perceived as an aggressively expanding Russia in the dire scenario of a conventional war with Russia?
The apocalyptic scenario of a war between NATO and Russia serves as a crucial framework for examining this issue. While amateurs deliberate over tactics, it is the professionals who delve into logistics; thus, our strategic assessment must begin in the logistical support zones of NATO and progress toward a prospective combat line in Europe.
To begin with, unlike Russia, none of the major NATO countries has mobilised their industries for wartime production, as demonstrated by Russia's continued dominance in manufacturing 155mm shells for Ukraine. This fact undermines the belief that Russia is ready to expand its control over more of Europe—if NATO genuinely held this belief, rapid mobilisation would already be underway.
Furthermore, it remains uncertain whether NATO could mobilise quickly or on the necessary scale to produce the equipment, ammunition, and personnel required to compete with Russia. Achieving such levels would undoubtedly necessitate a prolonged buildup, which would betray our intentions. This challenge extends beyond merely lost industrial capabilities to encompass diminished financial resources, with only Germany among the largest NATO nations maintaining a debt-to-GDP ratio below 100%.
Additionally, for there to be even a slim chance of prevailing in this dire NATO-Russia conflict scenario, U.S. forces would need to be deployed in significant numbers to mainland Europe. Even if the U.S. Army were to expand to the required scale—currently at a size of 473,000 in 2023, which is less than one-third of Russia's military—most American equipment and supplies would still have to be transported across the sea.
In that context, such movements would be susceptible to threats from Russian submarine-launched torpedoes and mines. Based on my background in underwater warfare, I am sceptical that NATO possesses the requisite anti-submarine or mine-warfare forces to safeguard Europe’s maritime supply routes.
Moreover, these same forces would struggle to protect Europe’s critical hydrocarbon imports, particularly oil and LNG, which are vital for the continent's economic stability. Any losses incurred due to vulnerabilities in our sea supply lines would not only hamper military production but also exacerbate economic difficulties faced by NATO citizens, as surging prices and energy shortages triggered by the onset of conflict would intensify the political pressure for resolution.
Firstly, our airports, seaports, training facilities, and logistics bases would be vulnerable to conventional ballistic missile strikes, for which our defensive capabilities are severely lacking. In fact, with the Oreshnik missile, we have no means of defence whatsoever. A missile travelling at over Mach 10 could obliterate a NATO arms manufacturing site or military installations for the navy, army, and air force. Similar to events in Ukraine, Russia’s ballistic offensive would focus on our transportation, logistics, and energy systems. Back in 2003, during my tenure with the Policy Planning staff at the British Ministry of Defence, our post-9/11 threat assessment indicated that a successful strike on an LNG terminal like Milford Haven, Rotterdam, or Barcelona would lead to consequences comparable to a nuclear incident. The resulting economic shock would swiftly resonate throughout a European continent increasingly reliant on LNG.
Secondly, in contrast to Russia, the forces of NATO member states are quite diverse. From my personal experience leading offshore training for European naval vessels at Flag Officer Sea Training in Plymouth and subsequently collaborating with NATO troops in Afghanistan, I observed that while NATO forces were highly motivated, they demonstrated varying levels of technological progress and operational effectiveness.
Furthermore, it’s worth noting that besides a few NATO trainers stationed in Ukraine, our military personnel are trained based on a pre-drone “manoeuvre doctrine” and lack practical experience in modern peer-to-peer attritional conflict. In contrast, the Russian military now boasts nearly three years of combat experience and is indisputably the most battle-tested force globally.
We might consider revisiting the perspective of numerous Western realists who argue that the expansion of NATO served as the catalyst for the Russo-Ukraine War. The Russians repeatedly cautioned us that such enlargement crossed a crucial boundary. This concern was also shared by some of our most esteemed strategic minds, including George Kennan in 1996, Henry Kissinger, Jack Matlock, as well as Bill Burns in his well-known ‘Nyet means Nyet’ diplomatic message, and more recently by John Mearsheimer with his predictions from 2014. All of these warnings have gone unheeded.
The reality is that NATO now stands to address the dangers resulting from its ongoing presence. However, as our analysis indicates, NATO lacks the capability to overcome the central threat that its mere existence has generated.
Thus, it may be an appropriate moment to engage in a candid discussion regarding NATO’s future and to pose two critical questions: How can we achieve the sustainable peace in Europe that all parties involved in the conflict desire? And, is NATO the main barrier to attaining this sustainable peace?